

## City and County Home Rule – An Overview

### I. Introduction

#### A. Cities prior to July 1, 1961—Effective Date of Constitutional Home Rule

##### 1. Art. 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution in 1960

“ § 5. Provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns and villages; and their power of taxation, assessment borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power.”

##### 2. Article 2, § 17 of the Kansas Constitution in 1960:

“ § 17. Uniform operation of laws of a general nature; special laws; urban areas. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; and whether or not a law enacted is repugnant to this provision of the constitution shall be construed and determined by the courts of the state: *Provided*, The legislature may designate areas in counties that have become urban in character as “urban areas” and enact special laws giving to such counties or urban areas such powers of local government and consolidation of local government as the legislature may deem proper.”

#### B. Counties prior to July 1, 1974—Effective Date Statutory Home Rule

#### C. Net Result: Dillon’s Rule in Action

Dillon’s Rule, although formulated by the courts for cities, is a reflection of the general dependency of all local governments upon state legislatures absent a home rule grant of authority. Dillon’s Rule states:

“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,

those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.... These principles are of transcendent importance, and lie at the foundation of the law of municipal corporations....” See Dillon, *Municipal Corporations*, Sec. 237 (5th ed. 1911).

13-1491. Tax levy for fire protection in cities between 60,000 and 125,000; transfer of revenue. The governing body of a city of the first class having a population of more than sixty thousand (60,000) and less than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) is authorized to levy annually a general tax on all property in such city to pay for the cost of fire protection. The levy for such purposes shall not exceed 0.75 of a mill. When said taxes are collected it shall be the duty of the city treasurer to immediately transfer the same to the general fund for the waterworks department in payment of the cost of fire protection. (Repealed 1969).

#### D. City Home Rule: A New Era

1. A new era in city-state relations was inaugurated on July 1, 1961, the effective date of the City Home Rule Amendment approved by voters at the November 1960 general election. Since that date, cities can look directly to the Kansas Constitution, Article 12, §5, for the source of their powers. Cities are no longer dependent upon specific enabling acts of the legislature since the Home Rule Amendment has in effect stood Dillon’s Rule on its head by providing a direct source of legislative power for cities. See Clark, “*State Control of Local Government In Kansas, Special Legislation and Home Rule*,” 20 Kan. L. Rev. 631 at 654 (1972).
2. *Kansas Constitution* Art. 12, §5 states , in part, the following:

“(b) Cities are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and government including the levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions except when and as the levying of any tax, excise fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohibited by enactment of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class: *Provided*, That the legislature may establish not to exceed four

classes of cities for the purpose of imposing all such limitations or prohibitions. Cities shall exercise such determination by ordinance passed by the governing body with referendums only in such cases as prescribed by the legislature, subject only to enactments of the legislature of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities, to other enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities, to enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction and to enactments of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness. All enactments relating to cities now in effect or hereafter enacted and as later amended and until repealed shall govern cities except as cities shall exempt themselves by charter ordinances as herein provided for in subsection (c).

(d) Powers and authority granted cities pursuant to this section shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of self-government."

#### E. Brief History of County Home Rule

1. Initial interest in improving Kansas county government in the early 1960s can be traced to the Second Commission on Revision of the Kansas Constitution appointed by Governor John Anderson, Jr. The report, made to the Governor and the legislature on January 1, 1963, contained, in lieu of any specific recommendations for constitutional revision regarding county government, a separate report on county reorganization and the *Kansas Constitution*. This separate report was prepared by Dr. Walter E. Sandelius, Chairman of the Second Commission and a political science faculty member at the University of Kansas, and Frances S. Nelson, a research assistant from the University of Kansas Governmental Research Center. The report noted that proposals for structural modernization of counties ordinarily follow one or more of three approaches: consolidation, either geographical or functional; institution of the county manager or executive system; and home rule. In discussing each of these three approaches and changes that would be necessary in the *Kansas Constitution* for their implementation, the report concluded that there were very few constitutional barriers that would impede bringing these changes about. (See *Report of the Second Commission on Revision of the Kansas Constitution*, Prepared by Walter E. Sandelius, January 1, 1963, p. 113.) An article in the January 1972 issue of the *Kansas Government Journal*, entitled *Counties Opt for Home Rule*, listed those various county officials' associations which had jointly endorsed a policy statement recommending the legislature

grant counties home rule with broad powers of local self-determination. The article noted that the proposed legislative enactment was substantially similar to the city home rule constitutional amendment. The article contained a preliminary bill draft which set the pattern for future home rule bills submitted to the legislature and for the home rule legislation that eventually passed in 1974.

F. County Grant of Home Rule

The 1974 Legislature enacted SB 175 which granted counties home rule powers. K.S.A. 19-101a provides:

“The board of county commissioners may transact all county business and perform all powers of local legislation and administration it deems appropriate, subject only to the following limitations, restrictions or prohibitions...

(b) Counties shall apply the powers of local legislation granted in subsection (a) by resolution of the board of county commissioners. If no statutory authority exists for such local legislation other than that set forth in subsection (a) and the local legislation proposed under the authority of such subsection is not contrary to any act of the legislature, such local legislation shall become effective upon passage of a resolution of the board and publication in the official county newspaper. If the legislation proposed by the board under authority of subsection (a) is contrary to an act of the legislature which is applicable to the particular county but not uniformly applicable to all counties, such legislation shall become effective by passage of a charter resolution in the manner provided in K.S.A. 19-101b, and amendments thereto.

(c) Any resolution adopted by a county which conflicts with the restrictions in subsection (a) is null and void.

KSA 19-101c provides:

The powers granted counties pursuant to this act shall be referred to as county home rule powers and they shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to counties the largest measure of self-government.

G. Johnson County Charter

Home rule took a different twist for Johnson County in November, 2000 when voters approved a home rule charter for county government authorized under K.S.A. 19-2680 *et seq.* as amended by the legislature in 1999 (HB 2429). The charter does not expand Johnson County's home rule power except as it relates to county government structure. Briefly, the charter establishes a seven member board of county commissioners with six members elected by district and one member elected at large to serve as chair. The election for the board seats is on a non-partisan basis. The elected county offices of clerk, treasurer, and register of deeds were made appointive after the expiration of the then current officeholder's term. The charter also provides for a county manager to be appointed by the board. The charter contains a procedure to amend the charter by a three-fourths vote of the board's full membership and requires approval of the amendments by the electors of the county. Finally, the charter requires the appointment of future charter commissions to study Johnson County government at least every 10 years thereafter.

#### H. General Characteristics of City and County Home Rule

A general characteristic of the City Home Rule Amendment and the county home rule statutes is that both apply to all cities and all counties respectively regardless of their size. Further, both are self-executing in that there is no requirement that the legislature enact any law implementing it, nor are cities or counties required to hold an election, to adopt a charter, constitution or some type of ordinance declaring their intent to exercise home rule powers. The power is there for all 626 cities and 105 counties to use. No charter or local constitution need be adopted nor any election held to achieve the power except in the special case of Johnson County noted earlier.

#### I. Autonomy vs. Initiative Models

The home rule provisions adopted in various states have been classified by some scholars into two basic types: (1) The "initiative" or legislative type, under which a city may initiate legislation subject to ultimate state control (Kansas fits this model); and (2) the "autonomy" type, in which a city remains free of all control of the legislature in matters of "local concern." In the initiative or legislative model, all power that the legislature would be capable of delegating to cities is delegated by the home rule constitutional amendment. The legislature, however, is given the power to withdraw or limit home rule powers as provided in the constitutional grant. Under the autonomy model, also known as the "imperium in imperio" or state

within a state model, cities have exclusive control over their municipal affairs and the state legislature is without power to invade this “municipal” territory. State laws that do invade this municipal territory are unenforceable.

J. City and County Home Rule Similarities and Differences

City and county home rule powers, despite key differences, are in many ways substantially the same. This similarity was recognized by the Kansas Supreme Court in its first decision interpreting the county home rule statutes. In *Missouri Pacific Railroad v Board of Greeley County Commissioners*, 231 Kan. 225, 226, 643 P.2d 188 (1982), the court said:

“Although there have been numerous cases decided by the appellate courts of this state dealing with city home rule, we find no Kansas cases dealing with county home rule powers. However, the home rule powers granted to cities by constitutional amendment and to counties by legislative act appear to be similar and parallel each other in many particulars. The case law dealing with city home rule powers should be particularly helpful here” (my underline).

The legislature can restrict city home rule powers only by enacting uniform laws that apply in the same way to all cities unless it is one of the specific areas listed in the Home Rule Amendment *e.g.* debt limitations. By contrast, the state legislature has a much freer hand to restrict or even repeal county home rule. Because of its constitutional origins, only the voters of Kansas have the ability to repeal city home rule and voters may do this only after two-thirds of both houses of the Kansas Legislature have adopted a concurrent resolution calling for the amendment or repeal of the home rule provision. Another obvious difference which distinguishes city and county home rule is the numerous exceptions to county home rule powers that are found in the statutory home rule grant of power.

II. How City and County Home Rule is Exercised: “Ordinary” versus “Charter” Ordinances or Resolutions

A. City Ordinances–County Resolutions

Home rule powers of cities must be exercised by ordinance. See *Kansas Constitution* Article 12, §5(c). City ordinances are subject to certain formalities and other requirements that are contained in K.S.A. 12-3001 *et seq.* A city that attempts to exercise home rule

powers through a resolution rather than an ordinance does not meet the constitutional requirement noted above and as a result the action of the city is invalid. Home rule power of counties must be exercised by the board of county commissioners by resolution. K.S.A. 19-101a(b) provides:

“If no statutory authority exists for such local legislation other than that set forth in subsection (a) and the local legislation proposed under the authority of such subsection is not contrary to any act of the legislature, such local legislation shall become effective upon passage of a resolution of the board and publication in the official county newspaper.”

See also *General Building Contractor L. L. C. v Board of Shawnee County Commissioners*, 275 Kansas 525, 66 P. 2d 873 (2003) where the court stated that a county exercising the power of eminent domain under home rule must do this by resolution citing K.S.A. 19-101a(b).

B. “Ordinary” Home Rule Ordinances — County “Ordinary” Resolutions

The term “ordinary ordinance” was coined after the passage of the City Home Rule Amendment but is not specifically used therein. The intent of using the term is to distinguish ordinances passed under home rule authority which are not charter ordinances from other ordinances enacted by cities under specific enabling acts of the legislature. Ordinary ordinances are those referred to in Article 12, §5(b), where it provides that “...cities shall exercise such determination (home rule) by ordinance passed by the governing body with referendums only in such cases as prescribed by the legislature...” According to one commentator, Clark, “*State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation and Home Rule*,” 20 Kan. L.Rev. 631 at 658, the above language is the most significant aspect of the Home Rule Amendment since it gives Kansas cities the power to initiate legislation by ordinance without having to rely on enabling statutes. Clark’s term for this power and procedure is “affirmative home rule.”

I. Where No State Law Exists

There are several instances where cities and counties may use ordinary home rule ordinances or resolutions. The first is when a city or county desires to act and there is no state law on the subject sought to be addressed by the local legislation.

The regulation and licensure of massage parlors or adult entertainment studios by counties, upheld in *Moody v Board of Shawnee County Commissioners*, 237 Kan. 67, 697 P.2d 1310 (1985) is a good illustration of the first situation.

The county resolution was aimed at attacking prostitution occurring at adult entertainment studios. The resolution established fees, set forth provisions for revocation of licenses and permits upon notice and hearing, established hours of operation, prohibited unlawful sex acts and established criminal penalties. The court said the resolution clearly had a reasonable relationship to the harms sought to be prevented. The court rejected an argument of the plaintiff that the resolution somehow prohibited or infringed upon the protected right of nude dancing.

Another example of this type of home rule action is illustrated in the situation which a city became a limited partner in an enterprise to construct a wind turbine system and to sell electricity. See Op. Att'y Gen. 160 (1981). See also Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (2000) where cities and counties were said to have the power under home rule to prohibit ticket scalping at sporting or entertainment events on state and federal property if needed. See, also *General Building Contractors, L.L.C. v Board of Shawnee County Commissioners*, 275 Kan. 525, 66 P.3d 873 (2003), where the court upheld the right of a county to condemn private property for economic development purposes by the passage of a county resolution under home rule absent a specific grant of statutory authority.

In contrast to home rule authority, a state statute was the basis for exacting a smoking ordinance in *Steffes v City of Lawrence*, 284 Kan. 380, 160 P.3d 843 (2007), where the court upheld a smoking in public places ban imposed by the City of Lawrence. A bar owner was cited for a violation of the city ordinance banning smoking. The bar owner filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the ban was both unconstitutional, unconstitutionally vague and was preempted by state law. He also sought injunctive relief. The court rejected the preemption argument noting the state law, K.S.A. 21-4013, actually permits more stringent local regulations of smoking. The court also rejected the vagueness argument and upheld the constitutionality of the ban.

See *Abilene Retail No. 30, Inc. v Board of Commissioners of Dickinson County, Kan.*, 492 F.3d 1164 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007), for a discussion of the regulation of adult book stores and sexually oriented



businesses. Dickinson County passed two "ordinances" (resolutions). The first required a \$500 license; disclosure of certain corporate documents; and owners with a 10 percent or greater interest in the business, their fingerprinting and social security numbers; limited business hours between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.; limited signage; established a one-year amortization period (move the business to another location); and imposed a 1,500 foot distance from residences, schools, and churches. This ordinance was later amended by a second ordinance requiring: a \$100 license if 35 percent or more of the floor space or inventory was adult material; a 1,200 foot distance requirement; an amortization period of 2 years; and limitation of business hours to 6:00 a.m. to midnight. The federal district court granted summary judgment to the county. The Federal 10<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court decision in part, but reversed some portions of the decision. The court said a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the evidence cited by the county provided a sufficient connection between the operators of the adult bookstore and the negative secondary effects. The court rejected arguments that the bookstore owners right to privacy was violated or that law enforcement search provisions violated the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment.

## 2. Local Supplement to a State Law

The second instance where cities or counties may enact ordinary home rule ordinances or resolutions is when there is a uniform state law on the subject, the city or county wants to supplement the state law and there is no conflict between the state law and the local addition or supplement.

a. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld a Wichita ordinance extending the city's driving under the influence (DUI) ordinance to cover operating a bicycle while under the influence. See *City of Wichita v Hackett*, 275 Kan. 848, 69 P.3d. 621 (2003) where the court noted state law did not expressly authorize riding a bicycle under the influence of alcohol - state law merely failed to proscribe it.

b. See *Hutchinson Human Relations Commission v Midland Credit Management, Inc.*, 213 Kan. 308, 517 P.2d 158 (1973) where the court affirmed the ability of cities to establish local civil rights agencies despite the existence of a state civil rights commission and of state laws prohibiting acts of discrimination.

c. The use of home rule was the underlying assumption of the court in *City of Junction City v Lee*, 216 Kan. 495, 499, 532 P.2d 1292

(1975) when the court upheld an ordinary home rule ordinance defining the crime of unlawful use of weapons as the carrying of both concealed and unconcealed weapons. A uniform state law made it a crime only to carry a concealed weapon.

3. Supplement to a Charter Ordinance or Charter Resolution

A third instance of where an ordinary home rule ordinance may be used is as a supplement to a charter ordinance. This is the situation the Kansas Supreme Court addressed in *Farha v City of Wichita*, 284 Kan. 507, 161 P3d 717 (2007). The *City of Wichita* passed a charter ordinance exempting itself from a provision of the Kansas Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts which prohibits the imposition of court costs on defendants. The charter ordinance authorized the city to assess costs in certain cases and stated the specific costs would be set in the city code. A separate ordinary ordinance was passed by the city establishing court cost amounts tied to specific offenses and witness fees. Plaintiff argued the court cost schedule should have been included in the charter ordinance. The court held that the “substitute and additional provisions” requirement of Article 12§5(c)(3) was met by the city’s charter ordinance.

Note: A city’s charter ordinance should contain sufficient additional or substitute provisions to meet the constitutional test. A charter ordinance simply exempting a city from a non-uniform statute followed by a “trailer ordinary ordinance” likely would not pass constitutional muster. The same rule should apply to county charter resolutions.

4. Conflict and Preemption

a. How Does the Legislature Preempt City or County Home Rule

i. Where a uniform Law exists

The legislature, with some frequency, has preempted city home rule by passage of a uniform law which also contains clear preemptive language. Both are normally required. Some uniform laws, however, do not need any preemptive language since the law simply prohibits some action by a city. The primary areas where the legislature has preempted local action are in the levy of taxes, excises, fees, charges, and other exactions, in licensing and other regulatory activities in gun control and in gaming. Two examples where the legislature has clearly stated its desire to preempt local action and where the legislature

apparently has also enacted a uniform law include the following.

1. K.S.A. 2-2480 prohibits any city or county or other political subdivision from enacting or enforcing any law, ordinance, rule or regulation "in conflict" with, in addition to, or supplemental to the Kansas Pesticide Law and expressly invalidates any such law.

2. K.S.A. 40-2810 prohibits political subdivisions (cities and counties) from imposing any license, privilege, premium, or gross receipts tax or fee or any occupation tax based upon income, premiums, or gross receipts upon any life, fire and casualty, hail and county mutual fire insurance company organized under state laws. K.S.A. 40-1211 provides that the taxes and fees paid to the state by mutual insurance companies organized within or authorized to do business within the state are in lieu of all city fees, licenses, and taxes except those levied under other provisions of law.

b. Conflicts: Not Always Easy to Determine

Unless there is a uniform law applicable to all cities which contains language expressly prohibiting local legislation, then the focus is on the local legislation and whether there is a conflict with it and the state law. Stated another way, if it has been determined there is no clear legislative intent to preempt all local action, then the second part of the preemption-conflict analysis requires a focus on the issue of whether the local provisions conflict with state law.

The test most frequently cited to determine whether a conflict exists is found in the *City of Junction City v Lee*, 216 Kan. 495 (1975) case, cited in *City of Wichita v Hackett*, 275 Kan. 848, 851 69 P.3d 621 (2003) as follows: Does the local law permit or license that which the state law forbids or prohibit that which the state statutes authorize? If so, there is a conflict. Where both a local law and the statute are prohibitory and the local law goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the state prohibition, there is no conflict.

c. Home Rule: Charter Ordinances

1. Article 12, § 5(c) of the *Kansas Constitution* states:

"(c) (1) Any city may by charter ordinance elect in the manner prescribed in this section that the whole or any part of any enactment of the legislature applying to such city, other than enactments of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities, other enactments"

“applicable uniformly to all cities, and enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness, shall not apply to such city.

(2) A charter ordinance is an ordinance which exempts a city from the whole or any part of any enactment of the legislature as referred to in this section and which may provide substitute and additional provisions on the same subject. Such charter ordinance shall be so titled, shall designate specifically the enactment of the legislature or part thereof made inapplicable to such city by the adoption of such ordinance and contain the substitute and additional provisions, if any, and shall require a two-thirds vote of the members-elect of the governing body of such city. Every charter ordinance shall be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there is none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city.

(3) No charter ordinance shall take effect until sixty days after its final publication. If within sixty days of its final publication a petition signed by a number of electors of the city equal to not less than ten percent of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding regular city election shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such city demanding that such ordinance be submitted to a vote of the electors, it shall not take effect until submitted to a referendum and approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon. An election, if called, shall be called within thirty days and held within ninety days after the filing of the petition. The governing body shall pass an ordinance calling the election and fixing the date, which ordinance shall be published once each week for three consecutive weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there be none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city, and the election shall be conducted as elections for officers and by the officers handling such elections. The proposition shall be: "Shall charter ordinance No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled (title of ordinance) take effect?" The governing body may submit any charter ordinance to a referendum without petition by the same publication of the charter ordinance and the same publication of the ordinance calling the election as for ordinances upon petition and such charter ordinance shall then become effective when approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon. Each charter ordinance becoming effective shall be recorded by the clerk in a book maintained for that purpose with a statement of the manner of adoption and a certified copy shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall keep an index of the same.

(4) Each charter ordinance enacted shall control and prevail”

“over any prior or subsequent act of the governing body of the city and may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities.”

2. K.S.A. 19-101b states:

“(a) Any county, by charter resolution, may elect in the manner prescribed in this section that the whole or any part of any act of the legislature applying to such county other than those acts concerned with those limitations, restrictions or prohibitions set forth in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 19-101a, and amendments thereto, shall not apply to such county.

(b) A charter resolution is a resolution which exempts a county from the whole or any part of an act of the legislature and which may provide substitute and additional provisions on the same subject. Such charter resolution shall be so titled, shall designate specifically the act of the legislature or part thereof made inapplicable to such county by the passage of the resolution and shall contain any substitute and additional provisions. Such charter resolution shall require the unanimous vote of all board members unless the board determines prior to passage it is to be submitted to a referendum in the manner hereinafter provided, in which event such resolution shall require a 2/3 vote of the board. In counties with five or seven county commissioners, such charter resolution shall require a 2/3 vote of all board members unless the board determines prior to passage it is to be submitted to a referendum in the manner hereinafter provided, in which event such resolution shall require a majority vote of the board. Every charter resolution shall be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in the official county newspaper. A charter resolution shall take effect 60 days after final publication unless it is submitted to a referendum in which event it shall take effect when approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon.

(c) If within 60 days of the final publication of a charter resolution, a petition signed by a number of electors of a county equal to not less than 2% of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding November general election or 100 electors, whichever is the greater, shall be filed in the office of the county election officer demanding that such resolution be submitted to a vote of the electors, it shall not take effect until submitted to a referendum and approved by the electors. An election if called, shall be called within 30 days and held within 90 days after the filing of the petition. The board, by resolution, shall call the election and fix the date. Such resolution”

“shall be published once each week for three consecutive weeks in the official county newspaper, and the election shall be conducted in the same manner as are elections for officers of such county. The proposition shall be: "Shall charter resolution No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled (title of resolution) take effect?"The board may submit any charter resolution to a referendum without petition in the same manner as charter resolutions are submitted upon petition, except elections shall be called within 30 days and held within 90 days after the first publication of the charter resolution. Each charter resolution which becomes effective shall be recorded by the county election officer in a book maintained for that purpose with a statement of the manner of adoption, and a certified copy shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall keep an index of the same.

(d) Each charter resolution passed shall control and prevail over any prior or subsequent act of the board and may be repealed or amended only by charter resolution or by an act of the legislature uniformly applicable to all counties.

A county charter resolution exempts a county from the whole or any part of a nonuniform act of the legislature and provides substitute and additional provisions on the same subject. See K.S.A. 19-101b(b). Any county may use a charter resolution to exempt itself from the whole or any part of any act of the legislature applying to the county unless the act is one of those concerned with the limitations, restrictions, or prohibitions listed in K.S.A. 19-101a(a). See K.S.A. 19-101b(a) and 19-101a(b).

In summary, a county charter resolution can be used when a nonuniform state law: (1) applies to the particular county, but (2) is not one of those laws covered by any of the other limitations listed in K.S.A. 19-101a(a).”

### 3. County Charter Resolution Procedure

Procedures required for the passage of county charter resolutions are generally similar to those required of cities for the passage of charter ordinances, with some exceptions. In counties with three commissioners, charter resolutions must be passed by a unanimous vote unless the board determines ahead of time to submit the charter resolution to a referendum, in which case a two-thirds vote is required. The Attorney General has said that a charter resolution is validly adopted when approved by a unanimous vote, the vote does not have to be on a written resolution and a member of a three-member

board who later refuses to sign the charter resolution does not affect its validity. The statute does not require a unanimous signature and does not permit a later veto of the charter resolution by a commissioner who later refuses to sign it. See Op. Att'y Gen. 22 (1989).

A unanimous vote of a quorum is not sufficient to pass a valid charter resolution; a unanimous vote of all county commissioners is necessary. See Op. Att'y Gen. 4 (1997). In counties with a five or seven-member commission, a two-thirds vote is required to pass a charter resolution unless the charter resolution will be submitted to a vote, in which case a majority is required. See K.S.A. 19-101b.

County charter resolutions must be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in the official county newspaper. A charter resolution shall take effect 60 days after final publication unless submitted to a referendum in which case the effective date is when a majority of the electors approve it.

An election on the issue may be required if a petition signed by two percent of the number of electors who voted in the last November election or 100 electors, whichever is greater is drawn. The election must be called within 30 days and held within 90 days after filing the petition with the county election officer. The election is required to be conducted in the same manner as elections for officers of the county. Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (1986) concluded that the mail ballot election act could be utilized for such elections since the language "in the same manner as are elections for officers of the county" was deemed ambiguous. The Attorney General rejected a literal meaning of the language that would require an election on the issue of a charter resolution only at an election for county officers. Note that the mail ballot law may not be used at any election where any candidate is elected, retained, or recalled. See K.S.A. 25-432(d).

Since county home rule is a statutory grant of power, there may be some other state law that will take precedence over the home rule act. This argument was made by the Attorney General but rejected by the court in *State, ex rel Stephan v Board of Sedgwick County Commissioners*, 244 Kan. 536, 770 P.2d 455 (1989). The Attorney General challenged a county home rule resolution that increased the quorum requirements from three to four for the five-member Sedgwick County board of county commissioners. The Attorney General made the argument, among others, that this action violated public policy as stated in the Kansas Open Meetings Act. The court held that the Open Meetings Act did not limit the authority of a county commission to

increase its quorum requirements under home rule. The court also rejected an argument that K.S.A. 19-206, a nonuniform statute applying to counties over 8,000 population and providing that a majority of the board may call a special session, required that a quorum be a majority of the members of the board.

### III. County Home Rule: Growth of Restrictions

Due to the statutory nature of county home rule, the legislature may pass virtually any nonuniform law it sees fit to enact, regardless of subject matter, and then “lock out” the use of home rule by simply adding a further statutory restriction to county home rule. The eight statutory restrictions on county home rule powers incorporated in the original law enacted in 1974 (see L. 1974, ch. 110), have increased to 38 restrictions by 2009.

Restrictions similar to those contained in the city home rule amendment include: counties are subject to all acts which apply uniformly to all counties; counties may not alter or consolidate county boundaries; and counties are subject to acts of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness.

Restrictions generally fall into two categories: general prohibitions against counties engaging in certain types of activities and specific exceptions to the uniform enactments rule. The latter type of restriction is used whenever the legislature passes a nonuniform law applying to one or more counties but not all counties and desires to prohibit counties from exercising statutory home rule power to charter out of the nonuniform law. This latter type restriction accounts for a majority of the 39 restrictions.



**§ 5. Cities' powers of home rule.** (a) The legislature shall provide by general law, applicable to all cities, for the incorporation of cities and the methods by which city boundaries may be altered, cities may be merged or consolidated and cities may be dissolved: *Provided*, That existing laws on such subjects not applicable to all cities on the effective date of this amendment shall remain in effect until superseded by general law and such existing laws shall not be subject to charter ordinance.

(b) Cities are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and government including the levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions except when and as the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohibited by enactment of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class: *Provided*, That the legislature may establish not to exceed four classes of cities for the purpose of imposing all such limitations or prohibitions. Cities shall exercise such determination by ordinance passed by the governing body with referendums only in such cases as prescribed by the legislature, subject only to enactments of the legislature of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities, to other enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities, to enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction and to enactments of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness. All enactments relating to cities now in effect or hereafter enacted and as later amended and until repealed shall govern cities except as cities shall exempt themselves by charter ordinances as herein provided for in subsection (c).

(c) (1) Any city may by charter ordinance elect in the manner prescribed in this section that the whole or any part of any enactment of the legislature applying to such city, other than enactments of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities, other enactments applicable uniformly to all cities, and enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness, shall not apply to such city.

(2) A charter ordinance is an ordinance which exempts a city from the whole or any part of any enactment of the legislature as referred to in this section and which may provide substitute and additional provisions on the same subject. Such charter ordinance shall be so titled, shall designate specifically the enactment of the legislature or part thereof made inapplicable to such city by the adoption of such ordinance and contain the substitute and additional provisions, if any, and shall require a two-thirds vote of the members-elect of the governing body of such city. Every charter ordinance shall be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there is none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city.

(3) No charter ordinance shall take effect until sixty days after its final publication. If within sixty days of its final publication a petition signed by a number of electors of the city equal to not less than ten percent of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding regular city election shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such city demanding that such ordinance be submitted to a vote of the electors, it shall not take effect until submitted to a referendum and approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon. An election, if called, shall be called within thirty days and held within ninety days after the filing of the petition. The governing body shall pass an ordinance calling the election and fixing the date, which ordinance shall be published once each week for three consecutive weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there be none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city, and the election shall be conducted as elections for officers and by the officers handling such elections. The proposition shall be: "Shall charter ordinance No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled (title of ordinance) take effect?" The governing body may submit any charter ordinance to a referendum without petition by the same publication of the charter ordinance and the same publication of the ordinance calling the election as for ordinances upon petition and such charter ordinance shall then become effective when approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon. Each charter ordinance becoming effective shall be recorded by the clerk in a book maintained for that purpose with a statement of the manner of adoption and a certified copy shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall keep an index of the same.

(4) Each charter ordinance enacted shall control and prevail over any prior or subsequent act of the governing body of the city and may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities.

(d) Powers and authority granted cities pursuant to this section shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of self-government.

(e) This amendment shall be effective on and after July 1, 1961.

**19-101. County as corporation; powers generally; home rule.** That each organized county within this state shall be a body corporate and politic, and as such shall be empowered for the following purposes: *First*, to sue and be sued; *second*, to purchase and hold real and personal estate for the use of the county, and lands sold for taxes as provided by law; *third*, to sell and convey any real or personal estate owned by the county, and make such order respecting the same as may be deemed conducive to the interest of the inhabitants; *fourth*, to make all contracts and do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county, necessary to the exercise of its corporate or administrative powers; *fifth*, to exercise the powers of home rule to determine their local affairs and government authorized under the provisions of K.S.A. 19-101a; *sixth*, to exercise such other and further powers as may be especially conferred by law.

- 19-101a. Home rule powers; limitations, restrictions and prohibitions; procedure.** (a) The board of county commissioners may transact all county business and perform all powers of local legislation and administration it deems appropriate, subject only to the following limitations, restrictions or prohibitions:
- (1) Counties shall be subject to all acts of the legislature which apply uniformly to all counties.
  - (2) Counties may not affect the courts located therein.
  - (3) Counties shall be subject to acts of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness.
  - (4) In the exercise of powers of local legislation and administration authorized under provisions of this section, the home rule power conferred on cities to determine their local affairs and government shall not be superseded or impaired without the consent of the governing body of each city within a county which may be affected.
  - (5) Counties may not legislate on social welfare administered under state law enacted pursuant to or in conformity with public law No. 271 – 74<sup>th</sup> congress, or amendments thereof.
  - (6) Counties shall be subject to all acts of the legislature concerning elections, election commissioners and officers and their duties as such officers and the election of county officers.
  - (7) Counties shall be subject to the limitations and prohibitions imposed under K.S.A. 12-187 to 12-195, inclusive, and amendments thereto, prescribing limitations upon the levy of retailers' sales taxes by counties.
  - (8) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in statutes made nonuniform in application solely by reason of authorizing exceptions for counties having adopted a charter for county government.
  - (9) No county may levy ad valorem taxes under the authority of this section upon real property located within any redevelopment project area established under the authority of K.S.A. 12-1772, and amendments thereto, unless the resolution authorizing the same specifically authorized a portion of the proceeds of such levy to be used to pay the principal of and interest upon bonds issued by a city under the authority of K.S.A. 12-1774, and amendments thereto.
  - (10) Counties shall have no power under this section to exempt from any statute authorizing or requiring the levy of taxes and providing substitute and additional provisions on the same subject, unless the resolution authorizing the same specifically provides for a portion of the proceeds of such levy to be used to pay a portion of the principal and interest on bonds issued by cities under the authority of K.S.A. 12-1774, and amendments thereto.
  - (11) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the provisions of K.S.A. 19-4601 through 19-4625, and amendments thereto.
  - (12) Except as otherwise specifically authorized by K.S.A. 12-1,101 through 12-1,109, and amendments thereto, counties may not levy and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived.
  - (13) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 19-430, and amendments thereto.
  - (14) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 19-302, 19-502b, 19-503, 19-805 or 19-1202, and amendments thereto.
  - (15) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 19-15,139, 19-15,140 and 19-15,141, and amendments thereto.
  - (16) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the provisions of K.S.A. 12-1223, 12-1225, 12-1225a, 12-1225b, 12-1225c and 12-1226, and amendments thereto, or the provisions of K.S.A. 12-1260 through 12-1270 and 12-1276, and amendments thereto.
  - (17) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the provisions of K.S.A. 19-211, and amendments thereto.
  - (18) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the provisions of K.S.A. 19-4001 through 19-4015, and amendments thereto.
  - (19) Counties may not regulate the production or drilling of any oil or gas well in any manner which would result in the duplication of regulation by the state corporation commission and the Kansas department of health and environment pursuant to chapter 55 and chapter 65 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, and any rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Counties may not require any license or permit for the drilling or production of oil and gas wells. Counties may not impose any fee or charge for the drilling or production of any oil or gas well.
  - (20) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 79-41a04, and amendments thereto.
  - (21) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 79-1611, and amendments thereto.
  - (22) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 79-1494, and amendments thereto.
  - (23) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 19-202, and amendments thereto.
  - (24) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 19-204, and amendments thereto.
  - (25) Counties may not levy or impose an excise, severance or any other tax in the nature of an excise tax upon the physical severance and production of any mineral or other material from the earth or water.
  - (26) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 79-2017 or 79-2101, and amendments thereto.
  - (27) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 2-3302, 2-3305, 2-3307, 2-3318, 17-5904, 17-5908, 47-1219, 65-171d, 65-1,178 through 65-1,199, 65-3001 through 65-3028, and amendments thereto.

- (28) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 80-121, and amendments thereto.
- (29) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 19-228, and amendments thereto.
- (30) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the wireless enhanced 911 act, in the VoIP enhanced 911 act or in the provisions of K.S.A. 12-5301 through 12-5308, and amendments thereto.
- (31) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 26-601, and amendments thereto.
- (32) (A) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the Kansas liquor control act except as provided by paragraph (B).
- (B) Counties may adopt resolutions which are not in conflict with the Kansas liquor control act.
- (33) (A) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the Kansas cereal malt beverage act except as provided by paragraph (B).
- (B) Counties may adopt resolutions which are not in conflict with the Kansas cereal malt beverage act.
- (34) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the Kansas lottery act.
- (35) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in the Kansas expanded lottery act.
- (36) Counties may neither exempt from nor effect changes to the eminent domain procedure act.
- (37) Any county granted authority pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 19-5001 through 19-5005, and amendments thereto, shall be subject to the limitations and prohibitions imposed under K.S.A. 19-5001 through 19-5005, and amendments thereto.
- (38) Except as otherwise specifically authorized by K.S.A. 19-5001 through 19-5005, and amendments thereto, counties may not exercise any authority granted pursuant to K.S.A. 19-5001 through 19-5005, and amendments thereto, including the imposition or levy of any retailers' sales tax.
- (39) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 19-271, and amendments thereto.
- (b) Counties shall apply the powers of local legislation granted in subsection (a) by resolution of the board of county commissioners. If no statutory authority exists for such local legislation other than that set forth in subsection (a) and the local legislation proposed under the authority of such subsection is not contrary to any act of the legislature, such local legislation shall become effective upon passage of a resolution of the board and publication in the official county newspaper. If the legislation proposed by the board under authority of subsection (a) is contrary to an act of the legislature which is applicable to the particular county but not uniformly applicable to all counties, such legislation shall become effective by passage of a charter resolution in the manner provided in K.S.A. 19-101b, and amendments thereto.
- (c) Any resolution adopted by a county which conflicts with the restrictions in subsection (a) is null and void.

**13-656.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, § 5 (Special Session); Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-657.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, § 6 (Special Session); L. 1941, ch. 120, § 4; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-658, 13-659.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, §§ 7, 8 (Special Session); L. 1941, ch. 120, §§ 5, 6; L. 1943, ch. 93, §§ 1, 2; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-660.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, § 9 (Special Session); Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-661.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, § 10 (Special Session); L. 1941, ch. 120, § 7; L. 1943, ch. 93, § 3; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-662, 13-663.**

History: L. 1933, ch. 42, §§ 11, 12 (Special Session); Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-664 to 13-669.**

History: L. 1937, ch. 120, §§ 1 to 6; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-670.**

History: L. 1939, ch. 116, § 1; L. 1943, ch. 94, § 1; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-671 to 13-676.**

History: L. 1939, ch. 116, §§ 2 to 7; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-677 to 13-681.**

History: L. 1939, ch. 117, §§ 1 to 5; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-682 to 13-684.**

History: L. 1939, ch. 118, §§ 1 to 3; L. 1943, ch. 95, §§ 1 to 3; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-685, 13-686.**

History: L. 1939, ch. 118, §§ 4, 5; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**13-687 to 13-695.**

History: L. 1941, ch. 138, §§ 1 to 9; Repealed, L. 1945, ch. 111, § 15; July 1.

**Article 7.—FIRE DEPARTMENT****Cross References to Related Sections:**

Purchase of equipment, see 12-110a, 12-110b, 12-110c.

**CIVIL SERVICE****13-701.**

History: L. 1908, ch. 28, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 13-701; L. 1927, ch. 112, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 88, § 4; Repealed, L. 1998, ch. 42, § 1; July 1.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1907, ch. 117, § 1.

**CASE ANNOTATIONS**

1. City of Wichita not subject to any civil service rules or regulations. *Piper v. City of Wichita*, 174 K. 590, 591, 595, 598, 600, 601, 258 P.2d 253.

2. Wichita fire department not subject to this section or civil service act (13-2201 et seq.). *Piper v. City of Wichita*, 174 K. 590, 591, 595, 596, 597, 258 P.2d 253.

**13-702.**

History: L. 1908, ch. 28, § 2; R.S. 1923, § 13-702; L. 1975, ch. 52, § 3; Repealed, L. 1998, ch. 42, § 1; July 1.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1907, ch. 117, § 2.

**13-703, 13-704.**

History: L. 1908, ch. 28, §§ 3, 4; R.S. 1923, §§ 13-703, 13-704; Repealed, L. 1998, ch. 42, § 1; July 1.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1907, ch. 117, §§ 3, 4.

**MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS****13-705.**

History: L. 1915, ch. 119, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 13-705; L. 1927, ch. 113, § 1; Repealed, L. 1933, ch. 309, § 27; April 3.

**13-706 to 13-709.**

History: L. 1915, ch. 119, §§ 2 to 5; R.S. 1923, §§ 13-706 to 13-709; Repealed, L. 1969, ch. 93, § 1; July 1.

**13-710.**

History: L. 1913, ch. 97, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 13-710; Repealed, L. 1933, ch. 309, § 27; April 3.

**13-711 to 13-714.**

History: L. 1913, ch. 97, §§ 2 to 5; R.S. 1923, §§ 13-711 to 13-714; Repealed, L. 1969, ch. 93, § 1; July 1.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Recognizance given to obtain relief from illegal custody, without validity. *The State v. Davis*, 26 K. 205, 208.

**14-310.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 85; R.S. 1923, § 14-810; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 6; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 39; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 62.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Police judge has no jurisdiction over offense against state law. *The State v. Davis*, 26 K. 205, 208.
2. Offense committed outside city; no jurisdiction to examine or commit. *The State v. Davis*, 26 K. 205, 208.

**14-311.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 86; R.S. 1923, § 14-811; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 7; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 40; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 63.

**Revisor's Note:**

Later act, see 12-4411.

**14-312.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 87; R.S. 1923, § 14-812; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 12; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 45; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 64.

**14-313.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 88; R.S. 1923, § 14-813; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, §§ 9, 16; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, §§ 42, 49; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 65.

**Revisor's Note:**

Later act, see 12-4407, 12-4507.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Failure to pay fine; city ordinance not required to commit. In re *McCort*, Petitioner, 52 K. 18, 19, 34 P. 456.
2. Commitment until fine and costs paid held within statute. *Arkansas City v. Roberts*, 89 K. 680, 683, 132 P. 152.

**14-314.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 89; R.S. 1923, § 14-814; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 10; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 43; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 66.

**14-315.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 90; L. 1891, ch. 127, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 14-815; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 17; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 50; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 67.

**Revisor's Note:**

Later act, see 12-4601, 12-4602.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Violation of municipal regulation; district court quashed complaint; no appeal. *City of Salina v. Wait*, 56 K. 283, 43 P. 255.
2. Bond signed by defendant alone, approved by judge, not invalid. *Ottawa v. Johnson*, 73 K. 165, 166, 84 P. 749.
3. Error to dismiss appeal upon bond signed by defendant individually. *Ottawa v. Johnson*, 73 K. 165, 166, 84 P. 749.
4. Payment of fine and costs waives right to appeal. In re *Bair*, 166 K. 228, 233, 199 P.2d 807.
5. Discussed; appeal bond lacking surety met requirements of 19-223. *Buxton v. Ford County Comm'rs*, 170 K. 148, 150, 223 P.2d 734.
6. Cited; former requirements for appeals from municipal courts of second-class cities noted. *City of Overland Park v. Nikias*, 209 K. 643, 645, 498 P.2d 56.

**14-316.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 91; R.S. 1923, § 14-816; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 19; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 52; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 68.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Costs after reversal on appeal may be awarded against city. *Mariner, Mayor, etc., v. Mackey*, 25 K. 669, 672.
2. Method of collection of costs awarded against city considered. *Mariner, Mayor, etc., v. Mackey*, 25 K. 669, 672.

**14-317.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 92; R.S. 1923, § 14-817; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

**Source or prior law:**

L. 1867, ch. 68, art. 4, § 20; C.S. 1868, ch. 19, § 53; L. 1871, ch. 62, § 69.

**Revisor's Note:**

Later act, see 12-4106.

## CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Power to imprison for contempt cannot rest on mere implication. In re *Palmeter*, 58 K. 809, 811, 51 P. 288.
2. City council cannot confer power to imprison for contempt. In re *Palmeter*, 58 K. 809, 811, 51 P. 288.

**14-318.**

**History:** L. 1872, ch. 100, § 93; R.S. 1923, § 14-818; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

3. Taxation of costs against city; authority of police judge considered. *City of Iola v. Harris*, 40 K. 629, 630, 20 P. 521.

#### Article 6.—MARSHAL AND POLICE

##### Cross References to Related Sections:

Municipal court code, see 12-4101 et seq.

#### 15-601.

**History:** L. 1871, ch. 60, § 87; L. 1879, ch. 84, § 2; R.S. 1923, § 15-601; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

##### Source or prior law:

L. 1869, ch. 26, § 51.

##### CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. City not liable for damages from bad character of prison. *La Clef v. City of Concordia*, 41 K. 323, 21 P. 272.
2. City not liable for negligence of keeper of prison. *La Clef v. City of Concordia*, 41 K. 323, 21 P. 272.
3. City not bound to maintain comfortable, suitable, and healthy prison. *City of New Kiowa v. Craven*, 46 K. 114, 115, 116, 26 P. 426.
4. City not liable for death claimed caused by city jail. *City of New Kiowa v. Craven*, 46 K. 114, 115, 116, 26 P. 426.
5. General act concerns county jails only, not city jails. *City of New Kiowa v. Cravens*, 46 K. 114, 115, 116, 26 P. 426.

#### 15-602.

**History:** L. 1871, ch. 60, § 88; L. 1879, ch. 84, § 3; R.S. 1923, § 15-602; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

##### Source or prior law:

L. 1869, ch. 26, § 52.

#### 15-603.

**History:** L. 1871, ch. 60, § 89; R.S. 1923, § 15-603; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

##### Source or prior law:

L. 1869, ch. 26, § 54.

##### CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. City marshal may be held liable for false imprisonment. *Peters v. City of Lindsborg*, 40 K. 654, 20 P. 490.
2. Police officers not agents of city; liability of city considered. *Peters v. City of Lindsborg*, 40 K. 654, 20 P. 490.
3. Cities cannot ratify unlawful acts of police officers. *Peters v. City of Lindsborg*, 40 K. 654, 20 P. 490.

#### 15-604.

**History:** L. 1871, ch. 60, § 90; R.S. 1923, § 15-604; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

##### CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Power of removal by mayor and council; notice and hearing. *Gundelfinger v. Thiele*, 133 K. 31, 34, 36, 298 P. 769.

#### 15-605.

**History:** L. 1871, ch. 60, § 91; R.S. 1923, § 15-605; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 61, § 12-4702; April 1, 1974.

##### Source or prior law:

L. 1869, ch. 26, § 55.

#### Article 7.—PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

##### Cross References to Related Sections:

Cities generally, see ch. 12, art. 6.

General improvement and assessment law, see ch. 12, art. 6a.

Community building district, see ch. 15, art. 11b.

Procedures for correction of public improvement project bids based on mistakes, see 75-6901 et seq.

#### 15-701.

**History:** L. 1907, ch. 130, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 15-701; Repealed, L. 1973, ch. 82, § 1; July 1.

##### CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Necessity for formal ordinance on sewer construction contract. *Botts v. City of Valley Center*, 124 K. 9, 257 P. 226.

#### 15-702 to 15-705.

**History:** R.S. 1923, §§ 15-702 to 15-705; Repealed, L. 1959, ch. 68, § 1; June 30.

##### Source or prior law:

L. 1911, ch. 120, §§ 1 to 4.

#### 15-706.

**History:** L. 1921, ch. 144, § 1; R.S. 1923, § 15-706; L. 1933, ch. 142, § 1; Repealed, L. 1959, ch. 78, § 5; June 30.

#### 15-707.

**History:** L. 1921, ch. 144, § 2; R.S. 1923, § 15-707; Repealed, L. 1959, ch. 78, § 5; June 30.

#### 15-707a.

**History:** L. 1937, ch. 162, § 1; Repealed, L. 1951, ch. 131, § 1; June 30.

#### 15-707b.

**History:** L. 1947, ch. 174, § 1; Repealed, L. 1959, ch. 78, § 5; June 30.

#### 15-707c.

**History:** L. 1951, ch. 197, § 1; Repealed, L. 1963, ch. 129, § 1; June 30.

#### 15-708.

**History:** R.S. 1923, § 15-708; Repealed, L. 1959, ch. 78, § 5; June 30.

**Source or prior law:**  
L. 1921, ch. 144, § 3.

#### 15-708a.

**History:** L. 1953, ch. 121, § 1; Repealed, L. 1975, ch. 122, § 1; July 1.

#### 15-709.

**History:** L. 1929, ch. 98, § 1; L. 1951, ch. 188, § 1; L. 1967, ch. 114, § 1; Repealed, L. 1978, ch. 71, § 1; July 1.

sued without the approval of the state board of tax appeals.

Any surplus existing after the redemption of such warrants shall be handled in the manner prescribed by said section 79-2940. None of the provisions of the cash basis and budget laws of this state shall apply to any expenditures made, the payment of which has been provided for by the issuance of warrants under this act.

**History:** L. 1961, ch. 168, § 2; June 30.

**19-15,104. Same; application of act.** The provisions of this act shall apply only in counties having a population of more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) and less than forty thousand (40,000).

**History:** L. 1961, ch. 168, § 3; June 30.

**19-15,105. No-fund warrants for courthouse funds in certain counties between 10,000 and 13,000; limitation; conditions.** The board of county commissioners of any county having a population of not less than ten thousand (10,000) and not more than thirteen thousand (13,000) and having an equalized assessed, taxable, tangible valuation of not less than twenty-eight million dollars (\$28,000,000) and not more than thirty-nine million dollars (\$39,000,000) is hereby authorized to issue no-fund warrants, without an election, and in an amount not exceeding one hundred seventy-five thousand dollars (\$175,000) for the purpose of providing funds to be used in reconstructing, remodeling, repairing, improving, equipping and furnishing the courthouse of such county. The total amount of no-fund warrants herein authorized to be issued need not be issued for the total amount at one time, but may be issued from time to time as money is needed for the purpose for which the warrants are issued, but the total of all issues of such warrants shall not exceed \$175,000.

**History:** L. 1963, ch. 169, § 1; Feb. 22.

**Research and Practice Aids:**  
Counties <sup>o</sup> 164.  
C.J.S. Counties § 248.

**19-15,106. Same; tax levies to pay; cash basis and budget laws inapplicable.** Whenever no-fund warrants are issued under the authority provided by this act, the board of county commissioners shall make a tax levy at the first tax levying period after such warrants are issued, sufficient to pay such warrants and the interest thereon: *Provided*. That in lieu of making only one tax levy,

such board of county commissioners, if it deems it advisable, may make a tax levy each year for not to exceed five (5) years in approximately equal installments for the purpose of paying said warrants and the interest thereon. All such tax levies shall be in addition to all other levies authorized or limited by law and shall not be subject to the aggregate tax levy limit prescribed by K.S.A. 79-1947, or acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto.

Such warrants shall be issued, registered, redeemed and bear interest in the manner and in the form prescribed by K.S.A. 79-2940, except they shall not bear the notation required by said section and may be issued without the approval of the state board of tax appeals. Any surplus existing after the redemption of such warrants shall be handled in the manner prescribed by said section 79-2940. None of the provisions of the cash basis and budget laws of this state shall apply to any expenditures made, the payment of which has been provided for by the issuance of warrants under this act.

**History:** L. 1963, ch. 169, § 2; Feb. 22.

**Research and Practice Aids:**  
Counties <sup>o</sup> 192.  
C.J.S. Counties § 281.

**19-15,107. Purchase of abandoned U.S. post office building for county office space; resolution; limitation; bonds for remodeling and equipping.** Whenever the board of county commissioners of any county in which there is located in the county seat of said county an abandoned United States post office building by resolution finds that said county is in need of additional space for use as county offices and that said abandoned post office building would provide the necessary additional space for county offices, said board of county commissioners may purchase said abandoned United States post office building and the site on which is it located and may remodel and equip the same for use as additional space for county offices: *Provided*. That the total amount expended for such purchase and the remodeling and equipping of said building shall not exceed the sum of fifty thousand dollars (\$50,000).

The board of county commissioners in any such county is hereby authorized to issue general obligation bonds of the county for the purpose of providing funds to pay for the purchase of said building and site for the remodeling and equipping of the building so purchased. Such bonds