

21-6815. Imposition of presumptive sentence; jury requirements; departure sentencing; substantial and compelling reasons for departure; mitigating and aggravating factors. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing guidelines unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure sentence. If the sentencing judge departs from the presumptive sentence, the judge shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the departure.

(b) Subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6817(b), and amendments thereto, any fact that would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, shall be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

(c) (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (c)(3) and (e), the following nonexclusive list of mitigating factors may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist:

(A) The victim was an aggressor or participant in the criminal conduct associated with the crime of conviction.

(B) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or participated under circumstances of duress or compulsion. This factor may be considered when it is not sufficient as a complete defense.

(C) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed. The voluntary use of intoxicants, drugs or alcohol does not fall within the purview of this factor.

(D) The defendant, or the defendant's children, suffered a continuing pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the offense and the offense is a response to that abuse.

(E) The degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime of conviction was significantly less than typical for such an offense.

(F) The offender committed such crime as a result of an injury, including major depressive disorder, polytrauma, post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury, connected to service in a combat zone, as defined in section 112 of the federal internal revenue code of 1986, in the armed forces of the United States of America. As used in this subsection, "major depressive disorder," "polytrauma," "post-traumatic stress disorder" and "traumatic brain injury" shall mean the same as such terms are defined in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6630, and amendments thereto.

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c)(3), the following nonexclusive list of aggravating factors may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for departure exist:

(A) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity which was known or should have been known to the offender.

(B) The defendant's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested excessive brutality to the victim in a manner not normally present in that offense.

(C) The offense was motivated entirely or in part by the race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of the victim or the offense was motivated by the defendant's belief or perception, entirely or in part, of the race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of the victim whether or not the defendant's belief or perception was correct.

(D) The offense involved a fiduciary relationship which existed between the defendant and the victim.

(E) The defendant, 18 or more years of age, employed, hired, used, persuaded, induced, enticed or coerced any individual under 16 years of age to:

(i) Commit any person felony;

(ii) assist in avoiding detection or apprehension for commission of any person felony; or

(iii) attempt, conspire or solicit, as defined in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5301, 21-5302 and 21-5303, and amendments thereto, to commit any person felony.

That the defendant did not know the age of the individual under 16 years of age shall not be a consideration.

(F) The defendant's current crime of conviction is a crime of extreme sexual violence and the defendant is a predatory sex offender. As used in this subsection:

(i) "Crime of extreme sexual violence" is a felony limited to the following:

(a) A crime involving a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy with any person;

(b) a crime involving an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy or lewd fondling and touching with any child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age and with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization;

(c) a crime involving an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy or lewd fondling and touching with any child who is less than 14 years of age;

(d) aggravated human trafficking, as defined in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5426(b), and amendments thereto, if the victim is less than 14 years of age; or

(e) commercial sexual exploitation of a child, as defined in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6422, and amendments thereto, if the victim is less than 14 years of age.

(ii) "Predatory sex offender" is an offender who has been convicted of a crime of extreme sexual violence as the current crime of conviction and who:

(a) Has one or more prior convictions of any crimes of extreme sexual violence. Any prior conviction used to establish the defendant as a predatory sex offender pursuant to this subsection shall also be counted in determining the criminal history category; or

(b) suffers from a mental condition or personality disorder which makes the offender likely to engage in additional acts constituting crimes of extreme sexual violence.

(iii) "Mental condition or personality disorder" means an emotional, mental or physical illness, disease, abnormality, disorder, pathology or condition which motivates the person, affects the predisposition or desires of the person, or interferes with the capacity of the person to control impulses to commit crimes of extreme sexual violence.

(G) The defendant was incarcerated during the commission of the offense.

(H) The crime involved two or more participants in the criminal conduct, and the defendant played a major role in the crime as the organizer, leader, recruiter, manager or supervisor.

In determining whether aggravating factors exist as provided in this section, the court shall review the victim impact statement.

(3) If a factual aspect of a crime is a statutory element of the crime or is used to subclassify the crime on the crime severity scale, that aspect of the current crime of conviction may be used as an aggravating or mitigating factor only if the criminal conduct constituting that aspect of the current crime of conviction is significantly different from the usual criminal conduct captured by the aspect of the crime.

(d) In determining aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the court shall consider:

(1) Any evidence received during the proceeding;

(2) the presentence report;

(3) written briefs and oral arguments of either the state or counsel for the defendant; and

(4) any other evidence relevant to such aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the court finds trustworthy and reliable.

(e) Upon motion of the prosecutor stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who is alleged to have committed an offense, the court may consider such mitigation in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist. In considering this mitigating factor, the court may consider the following:

(1) The court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the prosecutor's evaluation of the assistance rendered;

(2) the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;

(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;

(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or the defendant's family resulting from such assistance; and

(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.

History: L. 2010, ch. 136, § 296; L. 2013, ch. 120, § 23; L. 2015, ch. 76, § 7; July 1.